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F oreign  Loans, B anks and C apital 
M arkets in  M exico, 1880-1910 1
The history of foreign public debts is frequently analyzed as a 
specific function of government finance w ithout tak ing  into ac­
count other elem ents related to the overall evolution of finan­
cial m arkets. In this paper the em phasis is placed on the close 
relationship between public debts (internal and external), bank­
ing developments and the growth of capital m arkets. One of 
the central objectives of the research presented is to demon­
stra te  th a t for the historical case under study, Mexico in 
1880-1910, all of these factors -  public debts, banks and capital 
m arkets -  should be analyzed in conjunction in order to under­
stand  the dynamics and close links between public and private 
finance. In particular, this paper intends to explore the way in 
which the restructuring  of the Mexican public debt influenced 
the development of money and capital m arkets a t th is critical 
juncture in the "takeoff' of modern capitalism  in Mexico. We 
will begin w ith a general overview and then  proceed to the 
analysis of the specific variables.
In the mid and late 1880s the restructuring  and conversion 
of the outstanding Mexican public debt was successfully accom­
plished. The financial negotiations brought to a close six decades 
of conflict between the Mexican government and its foreign cre­
ditors. Indeed, it may be argued th a t these renegotiations were
1 For the  preparation  of this paper I received support from the  Centro de Estudios Eco­
nómicos of the  Colegio de México. I also wish to acknowledge the  assistance of Carlos 
Rodriguez in the  compilation of da ta  and of Enrique Vega in the preparation  of the 
figures.
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the m ost complex transactions undertaken by Latin American 
politicians and European bankers up until th a t date. The con­
version of the Mexican external debt, however, should not be 
seen m erely as an  attem pt to get the foreign bondholders off the 
back of the government by complying w ith the ir demands. Mexi­
can public officials had long dem onstrated th a t they could prove 
impervious to the dem ands of foreign creditors.2
The reasons for seeking to restructure Mexican public debts 
in the 1880s were linked to a set of new conditions. Most im ­
portan t was the need to raise capital both locally and abroad for 
public and private economic expansion. During the adm inistra­
tion of G eneral M anuel González (1880-1884) entrepreneurs 
and investors from the U nited S tates began to channel a signif­
icant flow of funds into Mexican railroads and mines, bu t Euro­
pean capitalists proved reticent to commit the ir finances in 
sim ilar enterprises. The Mexican élite believed th a t by con­
verting the external debt (mostly held in England) the govern­
m ent would facilitate access to European capital m arkets for 
new loans and additional direct investm ent. In addition, they 
felt th a t the conversion of the internal debt would stabilize 
public finances and make local sources of credit more readily 
available.
The urgency of reaching an agreem ent w ith local and foreign 
creditors became m anifest by the end of 1883 as a resu lt of 
ballooning government expenditures and deficits. However, in 
order to convince European investors th a t Mexico was a credit­
worthy nation, public authorities were obliged to adopt new fi­
nancial instrum ents th a t could guarantee the fu ture service of 
the debt. The most im portant initiative taken in th is regard 
was the establishm ent of the Banco Nacional de México (BA- 
NAMEX) in  February 1884, which became the agency for tran s­
2 Indeed, under the  leadership of Benito Juárez  in 1861, the Mexican government had 
proved willing to suspend paym ents on the debt a t the risk of m ilitary invasion. The 
consequences of th is fateful decision were clearly disastrous, as it helped spark the 
French arm ed intervention in Mexico in the years 1862-67. Nonetheless, from 1867 to 
1885 no paym ents were forthcoming to European bondholders on the Mexican foreign 
debts.
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fer of in terest paym ents abroad.3 The new institu tion  not only 
had sufficient local capital resources to assist the government 
w ith short-term  credits for the current accounts bu t also had 
excellent financial connections in Europe since the leading 
stockholders of BANAMEX were prom inent financiers in Paris, 
London and Berlin.
The Mexican government subsequently authorized represent­
atives of BANAMEX to in itia te direct negotiations w ith the for­
eign bondholders in order to see if a debt conversion could be 
worked out. These transactions, however, were cut short by a 
fiscal and financial crisis th a t h it the Mexican sta te  in  mid- 
1885. The government was subjected to the vicious scissors ef­
fects of dropping revenues, which resulted from a decline in 
trade, and rising short-term  debts, w ith the resu lt th a t ordi­
nary budgeted expenditures could not be met. Close to 80 per­
cent of customs revenues were pledged to cover subsidies to 
private railroad firms or to BANAMEX, m aking it impossible 
to cover such essentials as the pay of arm y officers and soldiers 
as well as tax  officials.
In the m idst of this crisis Finance M inister M anuel Dublán 
ordered a freeze on the paym ent of short-term  credits and the 
establishm ent of a general plan to convert the entire internal 
and external debt. Despite initial opposition, the debt conver­
sion of 1885 proved a success and laid the groundwork for the 
issue of the great foreign loan of 1888 as well as a succession of 
foreign loans over the following two decades. In this regard, 
government policies were clearly successful in stabilizing n a­
tional finances which had long been subject to extreme fluctua­
tions. They were also instrum ental in attracting  a large flow of 
foreign capital to Mexico which many contemporaries consider­
ed essential to the overall economic expansion of the nation.
More difficult to answ er is the question of w hether these pub­
lic debt policies contributed to the expansion of local capital
3 This bank was created by the fusion of the Banco M ercantil Mexicano and the  Banco 
Nacional Mexicano, both of which had been founded in 1881. For details see Ludlow 
(1986: 299-345).
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m arkets. T hat the Mexican banking system grew rapidly in 
this period and th a t th is was closely linked to the stabilization 
of government finance seems clear. But the growth of banks 
implied essentially a modernization of local money markets 
dealing prim arily in short and m edium -term  credits ra ther 
than  the development of authentic capital markets oriented 
towards longer-term  investm ents in public or private securities.
I t is the purpose of this paper to explore some of these ques­
tions, beginning w ith an analysis of the somewhat singular 
natu re  of Mexican credit m arkets before 1880, the relationship 
between banking and debt reforms in the 1880s, and the sub­
sequent expansion and diversification of financial activities in 
a period of rapid if uneven economic growth.
1. M ex ica n  M on ey  M ark ets B efo re  1880
Although it is possible to affirm th a t in Mexico a relatively 
"modern" money m arket began to be operative in the 1880s, it 
is im portant to keep in mind the considerable obstacles th a t 
had existed prior to this decade to the development of fluid cred­
it transactions of the type one normally associates w ith a capi­
ta lis t economy. The peculiarities of the m onetary and credit sys­
tem in Mexico during the first half-century after the W ars of 
Independence m erit a brief commentary in order to grasp the 
profound im pact of the financial and banking reforms th a t took 
place in the 1880s.
It should be noted, in the first place, th a t for decades Mexi­
can finances were dominated by the quandary of public debts. 
W ith the exception of a few years the Mexican government re­
m ained from 1828 until the 1880s in a sta te  of v irtual default 
on its foreign debts.4 The relationship between foreign indebted­
4 The Mexican government provided several paym ents to foreign bondholders in  1837, 
in the years 1848-50 and during the im perial government of Maximilian, 1863-67, but 
otherw ise no service was forthcoming to foreign bondholders. For details see Bazant 
(1968).
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ness and in ternal finances during this long period has been an a­
lyzed in a variety  of recent studies which dem onstrate th a t from 
the 1830s onwards, due to the lack of new foreign loans, Mexi­
can Finance M inisters were obliged to rely on local sources of 
credit which provided funds a t extremely high ra tes of interest. 
The result, as B arbara Tenenbaum has dem onstrated, was 
th a t internal public debts became the major cause of govern­
m ent deficits.5 In fact, the operations of Mexican money m ar­
kets were largely determ ined and skewed by the great weight 
of these debts which forced most available liquid funds into the 
hands of the government and of the coterie of powerful money­
lenders who largely controlled the state  treasury. In the long 
run  th is m eant th a t the stabilization of Mexican finances, in ­
cluding the conversion of old foreign debts, would depend upon 
the possibility of breaking out of the vicious circle of high-inter- 
est in ternal public debts which impeded the transform ation 
and expansion of local money m arkets.
But w hat was the natu re  of the Mexican money m arket in 
this early era? It is worth pointing out in th is context th a t al­
though compared to, let's say, Argentina or Brazil, the Mexican 
economy was slow in adopting banking practices, money and 
credit m arkets of a ra th e r special sort did function throughout 
the period 1820-1880. There developed, in fact, two quite differ­
en t types of credit m arkets a t the time. The first was the finan­
cial m arket directly linked to the supply of funds for the gov­
ernm ent, which we have already mentioned. The second were 
local credit m arkets mostly oriented towards the supply of 
funds for landowners, mine operators and some m anufacturers.6 
Since we are in terested  in this essay in the analysis of public 
debts, we will lim it our comments essentially to the first of the 
two financial m arkets mentioned, which had its locus of opera­
tions in the nation's capital.
5 The enormous impact of in ternal debts on government finance became m anifest from 
the  late 1830s. For details see Tenenbaum  (1986b).
6 The only in-depth study of these local credit m arkets th a t we know of is the  excellent 
study by W iemers (1985: 519-545).
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By the m id-century there had developed a money m arket in 
Mexico City which had some ra th e r unique characteristics. In 
the first place, it should be noted th a t it was a highly oligopo­
listic m arket, controlled by tw enty to twenty-five im portant 
m erchant houses, involved in the import/export business as 
well as in m ining and textile enterprises and, naturally , in the 
provision of loans for the impecunious government.7 In fact, the 
bulk of credit transactions consisted in the buying and selling 
of a variety of government securities. Among these were short­
term  securities such as the "certificados de aduanas" (certifi­
cates th a t could be used to pay customs duties) which were pop­
ular among m erchants because of their liquidity and the large 
demand th a t existed for them. The volume of "certificados de 
aduanas" th a t circulated from the 1830s onwards was large 
and continued to be so for decades (Tenenbaum 1986b: 60).8 
O ther relatively short-term  securities included a variety  of treas­
ury bills and bonds, "pagarés", "vales de alcance" and "vales de 
amortización" (mostly promissory notes of one kind or another), 
although it should be noted th a t much of this paper was rela­
tively difficult to liquidate. Finally, there were longer-term gov­
ernm ent securities in which the moneylenders invested: these 
included shares and bonds of the Banco de Avío (a public in ­
dustrial bank which operated between 1830 and 1840), stock of 
the tobacco monopoly (leased in the 1840s as a private en ter­
prise), and shares in mining companies controlled by the gov­
ernm ent, such as the Fresnillo silver mines of Zacatecas.
Although the num ber and variety of securities sold was con­
siderable in the 1830-60 period, it would be erroneous to con­
ceive of these transactions in term s of a stable or open money 
m arket. This m arket was not free but ra th e r closed, being lim ­
ited on the supply side to a small group of firms (as previously
7 A num ber of cases studies of these m erchant houses have been published. See Te­
nenbaum  (1986b), W alker (Ms. 1981) and Cardoso (1978).
8 So considerable were these transactions th a t in 1836 the  government created a special 
"Fifteen Percent Fund" which guaranteed the various holders of the  customs certifi­
cates 15 percent of the  annual revenues of all the Mexican customhouses. See Tenen­
baum  (1986b: 60).
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mentioned) th a t had liquid cash and could make advances, and 
on the dem and side, basically to one monopolistic entity  th a t 
took the bulk of the loans, nam ely the federal government.
The effects of th is situation on financial operations were 
striking. In  the first place, rates o f interest on virtually  all 
loans were extremely high and volatile, ranging from 30 to 200 
percent per year. These rates were conditioned m ainly by two 
factors: (1) the extreme fluctuations of foreign trade, which af­
fected both the income of the m erchant houses doing the lending 
and th a t of the government, which relied m ainly on customs 
revenues; (2) the extreme penury of the government, which re­
quired large am ounts of cash to pay the army and the civilian 
adm inistration. In the second place, the i'isks on most credits to 
the government were abnormally high, a factor which also ex­
plains both the high in terest rates and the high level of bank­
ruptcies among moneylenders from the 1840s. These risks 
were related  to the highly unstable m ilitary and political s itua­
tion, to the rapid turnover of Finance M inisters, to the extreme 
fluctuations in government income, and to an established p a t­
tern  of tem porary repudiation of debts in tim es of crisis or war.
At any rate, it is clear th a t while the money m arket of Mexi­
co City in the first half of the nineteenth century did allow for 
a considerable volume of transactions in public securities, it 
did not constitute a capital m arket as such.9 A part from the 
high in terest rates, the great risks involved, and the m ulti­
faceted collection of government paper and bills in circulation, it 
should be noted th a t by the 1850s a very large am ount of the 
government debt was in a sta te  of v irtual m oratorium , or non­
payment. Two quite different solutions to th is problem were 
sought by the moneylenders. The first consisted in transform ing 
their holdings of in ternal government debt into external debts,
9 A review of notarial records of the  period indicates th a t there  were few transactions 
involving the  sale of shares of firms since these were mostly family enterprises. 
Among private enterprises, it would appear th a t only m ining companies, and to a les­
ser extent a  few textile firms, actively promoted the  sale of stock. On notarial records 
see Gonzalbo Aizpuru and Vázquez de K nauth (1985-87).
344 C arlos M arichal
guaranteed by England, France or Spain.10 The second lay in 
exchanging the ir bonds and other public credits for real estate 
resulting from the new legislation established in 1856-57 na­
tionalized the properties of the Catholic Church. These tran s­
actions made the money and credit m arket more complex and 
undoubtedly broadened its realm  of activities. Once again, how­
ever, there would appear to be some doubt as to w hether this 
tru ly  implied a process of modernization, or indeed if  it had 
anything to do w ith the creation of an incipient capital m arket.
For the period 1860-1880 the paucity of secondary studies 
makes it unwise to make any categorical statem ents about the 
evolution of the Mexico City money m arket. Certainly the es­
tablishm ent of the Bank of London and Mexico in 1864 during 
the Em pire of M aximilian suggests th a t some im portant 
changes were taking place, especially w ith regard to in terna­
tional financial traffic. B ut then again, this bank had a ra ther 
limited scope of activities and no other banking institutions 
followed in its steps until the 1880s. The risks of carrying on a 
regular banking business were still high, and therefore it may 
be presum ed th a t most of local credit transactions continued to 
be handled by a handful of m erchant houses. The la tte r firms, 
however, were, to a large degree, different from the moneylend­
ers who had dominated prior to I860.11
A somewhat different perspective can be garnered from the 
one existing case study of regional credit m arkets during this 
period. According to Eugene Wiemers, credit for landowners 
and farm ers in Veracruz was available a t relatively reasonable 
rates. He notes:
For most of the time before the railway was completed in the re­
gion, debt contracts for sale of property and for loans for agricul­
tu re  were regularly liquidated and repaym ents were predicta­
ble....That the m arket functioned as well as it did, despite w ar­
10 These were the  famous "Convention" debts, described, for example, by Wynne 
(1951,11: 55-62).
11 An in teresting  po rtra it of the "new" commercial and financial bourgeoisie of the cap­
ita l can be found in Ludlow (1990).
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fare and economic chaos a t the national level, is rem arkable. 
T hat la te r w riters would have an in terest in portraying condi­
tions as much worse than  they had in fact been is not rem ark­
able, because this version of the past provided one of the chief ra ­
tionales for porfirian economic policy (Wiemers 1985: 546).
W hether the situation here described was applicable to other 
regions of Mexico a t the time is open to question. Nonetheless, 
it would be wrong to argue th a t money and credit m arkets did 
not exist or did not operate w ith relative fluidity before 1880. 
On the other hand, it is evident th a t money m arkets -  partic­
ularly th a t of Mexico City -  had num erous peculiarities which 
were a function of their in tim ate connection w ith the erratic fi­
nances of the federal government. As the Mexican economy be­
gan to experience a phase of sustained expansion from the 
1870s, the pressures for financial and fiscal reform as well as 
for the creation of an authentic banking system gained strength.
2. T h e C rea tio n  o f  a  B a n k in g  N e tw o r k  in  M ex ico  C ity
H istorians have traditionally em phasized the role of foreign in ­
vestm ents as a key to the expansion experienced by the Mexican 
economy in the 1880s and 1890s. The considerable am ount of 
N orth American and European capital invested in railroads 
and mines was complemented from 1888 onwards by a series of 
foreign loans to the government. While not misplaced, th is fo­
cus should not lead one to underestim ate the contribution of lo­
cal capital and of state economic policies to the promotion of 
this new stage of transform ation of the national economy. In 
the first place, it would be erroneous to ignore the role of the 
state  in providing a new financial framework conducive to the 
functioning of a "capitalist" economy. The reforms carried out 
by the government in this regard included (a) new commercial 
legislation which progressively guaranteed the operations of 
joint-stock enterprises; (b) the resolution of the old debt quan­
dary, a prerequisite to the operation of a modern money m ar­
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ket; (c) the provision of concessions and financial subsidies for 
new companies. In the second place, it is im portant to keep in 
mind the contribution of local capital in the establishm ent of a 
banking network and of a a more modern money m arket which 
was essential both to the resolution of the public debt problem 
and to the development of new and large economic enterprises.
The creation of a banking network in Mexico City in the 
1880s is especially revealing of the mix of public and private 
factors which characterized the more ambitious economic proj­
ects of the Porfirian adm inistration. Until 1880, as has been 
noted, there existed only one commercial bank in the capital, 
nam ely the Bank of London and Mexico, although it should be 
kept in mind th a t there were a num ber of w ealthy m erchant 
houses th a t operated as private bankers to the m ercantile and 
m ining community.12 Precisely from this circle of merchant-fi- 
nanciers came the im petus to form two new banking in s titu ­
tions, the Banco Nacional Mexicano and the Banco M ercantil 
Mexicano, both established in 1881. The Banco M ercantil was 
founded basically w ith the capital of a group of wealthy 
m erchants of Spanish origin who controlled much of the whole­
sale business in Mexico City in textiles and food products. The 
Banco Nacional, on the other hand, was formed w ith a majority 
of foreign capital (French, British and Germ an financiers were 
heavily involved) and a minority portion of shares taken by 
wealthy Mexico City m erchants.
Subsequently, in 1882, the Banco Internacional Hipotecario 
was established by another group of entrepreneurs, an institu ­
tion intended to open up a new line of financial business, 
nam ely mortgages on urban and rural real estate. In addition, 
there existed another two credit institutions in the capital: the 
Monte de Piedad, the National Pawnshop, which received 
deposits on a fairly large scale and had the right to issue bank 
bills for a total sum of nine million pesos; and the Banco de 
Empleados, a semi-public entity intended to receive deposits of
12 For a comparative view of the  importance of the private banking firms in a contem­
porary economy see García López (1989: 111-132).
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government employees, although it was never successful in 
this venture.
By the year 1883, therefore, the Mexico City money m arket 
had changed dramatically. A variety of banking institutions 
were now in operation, which had issued a total of over 15 m il­
lion pesos in bank bills. The clients of these banks included im ­
port/export firms, the new railroad companies, shipping firms 
and a variety of local, wealthy customers. The discount on com­
mercial paper was expanding and rates had dropped to an av­
erage of 6-8 percent annually on the paper of the better known 
firms. The government was also able to get credit from the 
banks a t sim ilar rates, a fact which notably decreased its re ­
liance on the old moneylender circle and also dram atically re­
duced the costs of its short-term  or floating debt.
The government, however, did not m aintain stable credit re ­
lations w ith all the banks, but ra th e r established a privileged 
relationship w ith the Banco Nacional. The la tte r opened a reg­
u lar account for the M inistry of Finances which allowed the 
T reasury to draw large sums on the bank. In exchange, the 
bank was to take charge not only of the accounts of the nation­
al customhouses, including the sale of the traditional "certifica­
dos de aduanas", but also of the accounts of the Stam p Tax of­
fices in the nation's capital and of the National Lottery. In ef­
fect, the Banco Nacional thus became the government banker, 
and, in principle, only its bills were to be accepted a t the fiscal 
offices.13
The Banco Nacional did not lim it its loans to the federal gov­
ernm ent. It also provided funds for various local government 
entities. In early 1882, for example, it provided an advance of 
200,000 pesos to the municipal adm inistration of Veracruz, and 
la ter in the year a 30,000 peso credit to governor Madero, of 
the State of Coahuila. At the same time the bank made large 
loans to leading industrial and transport firms; among the big­
gest advances were those to the Hercules textile factory in
13 The precise details of the contracts established between the  government and the 
bank can be found sum m arized in Ludlow (1986).
348 C arlos M arichal
Q uerétaro and large contracts were signed w ith the Ferrocarril 
Mexicano, the m ain railroad company operating between Mexi­
co City, Puebla and Veracruz.14
From the beginning of 1883 the federal government began to 
pressure the Banco Nacional to provide larger loans, including 
the contracting of a two million peso bond issue. As on previous 
oaccasions, the bank refused to engage its own capital in such 
large loans, providing in May only an advance of 150,000 
pesos. Nonetheless, falling customs revenues forced the Finance 
M inistry to m aintain the pressure, and in November 1883 the 
Banco Nacional, in conjunction w ith seven allied m erchant 
houses in Mexico City and the Paris-based Banque Franco- 
Egyptienne, finally agreed to advance 700,000 silver pesos to 
the Treasury in exchange for one million pesos in customhouse 
certificates.15 The increasingly difficult financial position of the 
government, however, could not be resolved merely w ith one 
loan. According to published figures, the deficits in 1882-83 
had already surpassed two million pesos but were, in fact, much 
higher. The large expenditures on subsidies to private railroad 
companies were the main cause of this problem: the am ounts of 
subsidies surpassed seven million pesos in 1882-83 and three 
million pesos in 1883-84, which went to the Ferrocarril Cen­
tral, Mexicano and Interoceánico. These subsidies, as well as 
those for port works and shipping companies, were paid with 
"certificados de aduanas," which implied th a t a great percen­
tage of customs revenues was mortgaged to privately-owned 
firm s.16
14 The details can be found in the  Archivo Histórico BANAMEX, (AHBAN), Libro de 
Actas-Acuerdos del Consejo de Administración (1881-84).
15 The Banque Franco-Egyptienne was a leading foreign-based stockholder of the  Ban­
co Nacional. The Mexico City m erchant financiers concerned in th is deal included 
Bermejillo Hnos., Benecke Sues., Félix Cuevas, Gutheil y Cia., Ramón G. Guzmán, 
Lavie y Cía., and Antonio de Mier y Celis. The customs certificates were to be 
cashed a t the customs offices of the  Mexican Pacific ports. See Contrato no. 1, 
Sindicato "Ordenes del Pacífico," AHBAN, Libro de Contratos Originales de Em prés­
titos, 1883-1914.
16 In his financial report, M inister De la Peña sta ted  in Septem ber 1884 th a t 60 per­
cent of the  customs revenues of the  port of Campeche, 90 percent of those of
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The government authorities therefore resolved to have re ­
course to the "floating debt" (short-term  debt), tak ing  additional 
advances which were to be provided by the Banco Nacional. In 
toto, the Treasury requested the bank to provide the huge sum 
of five million pesos during the year 1884, in exchange for 
which the Banco Nacional was to take over virtually  the entire 
adm inistration of the customhouse certificates.17 But this was 
too large a ta sk  for the bank as it existed. W ithout additional 
capital the government credit requirem ents could not be met.
The solution found to these problems lay in the m erger of the 
Banco Nacional w ith the Banco M ercantil into one large bank, 
henceforth known as the Banco Nacional de México (BANA- 
MEX). Edouard Noetzlin, representative of the European stock­
holders, arrived in Mexico in February 1884 precisely for the 
purpose of signing the final agreem ents for the merger. He met 
w ith president M anuel González who suggested th a t an official 
commission be nam ed for th is purpose under the auspices and 
direction of general Porfirio Díaz. This was clearly big busi­
ness! Noetzlin, who m aintained good relations w ith Diaz, quick­
ly drafted an agreem ent for the merger, and by May it was 
ratified.18
The establishm ent of BAN AMEX represented a major change 
in Mexican finances as this institu tion now formally became 
the government's bank, although it rem ained privately owned 
and adm inistered. BANAMEX opened a large account for the 
Finance M inistry on which the la tte r could draw an annual to­
ta l of four million pesos. In exchange, the government allocated 
15 percent of all customs revenues to the bank as well as the 
income from the N ational Lottery and the stam p tax, as had 
been standing practice since 1881. However, apart from short­
Tampico and M atamoros and 84 percent of the  income of the  customhouse of 
Veracruz were m ortgaged to companies, m erchant houses and the  Banco Nacional 
(.Memoria de Hacienda, México 1884: LXX-LXXIX).
17 See discussion by the  bank directors of the government proposal in  AHBAN, Libro 
de Actas-Acuerdos del Consejo de Administración (1881-84), Jan u a ry  24, 1884.
18 The details of the contract establishing the Banco Nacional de México (May 31, 
1884) as well as additional clauses relating  to th e  financial relationship between the 
government and the  bank are found in  Castillo (1903: 19-52).
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term  credits, BANAMEX was also expected to help arrange 
some long-term finance for the government. Most im portantly, 
Noetzlin was personally charged by president González to 
serve as financial agent for Mexico in Europe and to arrange a 
foreign loan of six million pound sterling which would be ac­
companied by the conversion of the outstanding foreign debt.19 
The interaction of public and private finances was thus not 
only institutionalized but internationalized.
3. T h e C r is is  o f  1885: I ts  Im p act u p o n  th e  D eb t a n d  th e  
B a n k s
Perhaps the most in teresting aspect of the financial history of 
Mexico in the crisis years of 1884-85 is th a t for the first time it 
is possible to observe a close interaction between the evolution 
of Mexican money m arkets and foreign stock m arkets. This 
was a resu lt of the complex debt negotiations undertaken by 
Noetzlin in Europe and of the policies adopted by Finance M in­
ister Dublán.
Edouard Noetzlin, director of the Banque Franco-Égyptienne, 
m ain stockholder of BANAMEX, was known to be a shrewd 
financier w ith excellent connections in all the European money 
m arkets, an indispensable prerequisite for the restructuring  of 
the Mexican debt, which was held in London, Am sterdam  and 
Paris. Noetzlin was also known to be a m an sym pathetic to the 
Mexican government, as had been dem onstrated in the ad­
m inistration of the Banco Nacional from 1881 to 1884. This did 
not, however, imply th a t the Mexican government could confide 
blindly in his advice. Nonetheless, M anuel González decided to 
provide him  w ith a v irtual carte blanche and urged him to 
raise a foreign loan in Europe as soon as possible.
Not surprisingly, when Noetzlin returned  to Europe in the 
sum m er of 1884, he had little difficulty in putting together a fi­
19 For the  text of the legislative decree authorizing the foreign loan see Castillo (1903: 
17-18).
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nancial package which quickly received the support of Euro­
pean bankers and bondholders. According to this plan, the bulk 
of the outstanding Mexican debt, dating from as far back as 
1824, was to be converted into new bonds payable in gold. In 
order to carry out this plan, the Mexican government would 
negotiate w ith the foreign bankers the issue of six million 
pound sterling in bonds, the bulk of which would then  be 
handed over to the bondholders.
The news was welcomed by the Council of M inisters in Mexi­
co City, however, when the proposal was presented to the N a­
tional Congress, an acrimonious and impassioned debate broke 
out which lasted almost three weeks and stymied approval of 
the so-called "Noetzlin contract."20 Numerous deputies -  
including the prestigious intellectual Justo  S ierra -  argued in 
favor of arranging the loan w ith the European bankers, insis­
ting th a t th is would reduce the dependency on U nited States 
capital. But the opposition counterattacked, em phasizing the 
high costs of the transaction. Criticism was vented particularly  
against a clause which called for the paym ent of a series of 
huge commissions, totalling more than  13 million pesos, of 
which presum ably 10 million pesos would go to Noetzlin.21 In 
fact, the opposition of the press and the popular outcry became 
so intense tha t, before a final vote could be carried out, popular 
dem onstrations forced the closure of the legislature.
20 According to the Congressional Finance Commission, this was the first public debate 
on the question of the foreign debt in th irty  years, the last major legislative discus­
sion having taken  place in 1850 (Cám ara de Diputados, México 1885: 178-179).
21 It should be recalled th a t Noetzlin was acting in the  name of the  Banco Nacional de 
México and th a t the  commissions were probably intended to cover the huge ad­
vances the bank had been forced to make to the government on account of the  future 
proceeds of the  loan: these surpassed five million pesos between May and October, 
as well as two million pesos in previous months. Nonetheless, on being informed of 
the popular opposition, Noetzlin wired the government his renunciation of the 
commissions mentioned. The Noetzlin contract was analyzed critically by contem­
porary financial specialists, although the exact na tu re  of the commissions was never 
clarified. On Banco Nacional de México advances see the contracts signed between 
November 24, 1883, and October 10, 1884, AHBAN, Libro de C ontratos Originales 
de Em préstitos, 1883-1914. For critical interpretations of the Noetzlin contract see 
Casasus (1885: 457-480), Ortiz de Montellano (1886: 101-115, 461-551) and Bulnes 
(1885).
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The opposition to the loan plans was not entirely surprising 
since it took place as the González adm inistration was drawing 
to an end and the élite was in the m idst of extended and b itter 
in-fighting to determ ine who would be president in 1885. 
Indeed, it m ight be suspected th a t Porfirio Díaz, who was bent 
on retu rn ing  to power, could not have had much in terest in 
allowing his predecessor a major financial trium ph. In fact, 
after the accession of Diaz his new Finance M inister, Manuel 
Dublán, w asted no time in sending a telegram  to Noetzlin ad­
vising him  of the suspension of the proposed contract and loan 
negotiations.22
Dublán, nonetheless, could not risk  a complete break with 
BANAMEX and its foreign stockholders. He therefore pro­
ceeded to arrange a whole set of new contracts th a t provided 
the Treasury w ith much-needed short-term  credits and appar­
ently guaranteed the bank a steady flow of tax  proceeds for 
reim bursem ent. As a result, the "floating debt" of the govern­
m ent expanded rapidly, a situation which became increasingly 
untenable as a resu lt of a fall in in ternational silver prices and 
a decline in Mexican foreign trade.
By the early sum m er of 1885 public finances were ap­
proaching bankruptcy, and on June 22 M anuel Dublán took 
emergency action. Declaring th a t the government was faced 
w ith a potential deficit of 25 million pesos, he announced a 
suspension of paym ents on all short-term  government debts 
and a reduction of the salaries of all sta te  employees by 10-50 
percent. At the same time the Finance M inister ratified a pro­
posal for the conversion of all the outstanding bonded debt, both 
in ternal and external. Jointly these m easures constituted a fi­
nancial revolution, the consequences of which have not been 
adequately underlined by historians despite the ir importance 
for the course of Mexican public finance.
The suspension of paym ents on short-term  debt included a 
huge backlog of credits due to BANAMEX, to the three leading
22 Copy of communication dated Jan u ary  21, 1885, in Castillo (1903: 54-57).
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railroad companies and to a wide array  of public contractors 
and local creditors. The prestigious Mexico City newspaper, 
The Mexican Financier, described the m easures as a "golpe de 
Estado," suggesting th a t massive commercial bankruptcy 
would be the inevitable consequence. In fact, there was a bank 
panic, as long lines of clients of BANAMEX formed to take 
their money out of the accounts of a bank which they believed 
would fail w ithout government support. But BANAMEX 
survived, paying out in the course of a few days 150,000 pesos 
in cash in its offices in Puebla and over one million pesos in 
Mexico City until, finally, wary depositors became convinced 
th a t the institu tion  was solid and would not fall.23
The next group of creditors confronted w ith the onslaught 
were the railroad companies, since they now faced but dim pros­
pects of obtaining the abundant subsidies th a t had been pre­
viously provided by the government as a stim ulus to the con­
struction of new lines. The stockholders of one of the largest 
enterprises, the Mexican Central Railway, mostly investors 
from Boston, were in uproar. According to the Sem ana Mercantil 
the Boston newspapers had reported an outbreak of panic on 
the local stock exchange on June 25 and 26, 1885, once the 
news arrived from Mexico about the suspension of the paym ent 
of the customhouse certificates to the railroad.24
The response on the London Stock Exchange was more mixed. 
Initially the prices of old Mexican bonds rose since bondholders 
appeared to stand  some chance of improving the ir situation as 
a resu lt of the conversion plan. However, the rise in prices of 
Mexican securities slowed and finally stopped altogether when 
the financial press began to insist on the negative effects of the 
suspension of the railroad guarantees. The Central and N ation­
al lines, in which both American and B ritish investors had a 
stake as well as the Mexican Railway Company, a traditionally  
British-controlled enterprise, faced a certain fall in profits as a
23 Sem ana M ercantil (Mexico, Ju ly  6 and 13, 1885).
24 The edition of the  Sem ana Mercantil (Mexico) of Ju ly  13, 1885, cites various reports 
of The Boston Herald.
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resu lt of government action, and the bankers promoting their 
stock did not w ant to encourage the Mexican Finance M inister 
in his w ayward policies.25
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25 The Sem ana M ercantil (Mexico, Ju ly  13 and August 3, 1885) included extracts from 
the London financial press.
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In sum m ary, Dublan's emergency m easures created a furor 
both in Mexican and foreign money m arkets. Nonetheless, the 
suspension of paym ents on short-term  debts and obligations 
allowed the Mexican government a considerable respite, and 
during the following years public deficits declined steadily. The 
railroad investors received a considerable am ount of new in ter­
nal bonds (certificados de construcción de ferrocarriles) to guar­
antee future paym ents on their subsidies.26 And BANAMEX 
worked out a series of new financial arrangem ents w ith the 
government which assured it a regular percentage of fiscal in ­
come in order to liquidate a portion of the money it had ad­
vanced to the government.27 As result, the financial situation 
stabilized and the prospect of being able to raise a large foreign 
loan improved markedly.
4. T h e D eb t C o n v ers io n  o f  1886-1887
For some tim e foreign investors rem ained extremely wary of 
any proposals by the Mexican government to invest more mon­
ey in private enterprises or in a prospective loan. The effects of 
the crisis of June 1885 did not really term inate, in this sense, 
until June 1886 when, after prolonged negotiations, the finan­
cial agent of Mexico in London, general Francisco Z. Mena, 
reached an agreem ent w ith the Corporation of Foreign Bond­
holders to recognize and convert the outstanding foreign debt 
of Mexico.28 The bondholders now accepted the clauses of the 
June 22, 1885, decrees by which they exchanged the ir old six 
percent bonds for new three percent bonds on which they would
26 For regulations on am ortization of these "certificados" see Boletín del Ministerio de 
Hacienda (Mexico, 1886), pp. 250-251.
27 See contracts 9, 10 and 11 between Banco Nacional de México and the  government, 
signed October 21, 1885, Jan u a ry  11, 1886, and February 4, 1886, AHBAN, Libro de 
Contratos Originales de Em préstitos, 1883-1914.
28 For the text of the agreem ent signed Ju n e  23, 1886, w ith E. P. Bouverie, president 
of the  Corporation, and w ith H. Sheridan, president of the Committee of Mexican 
Bondholders, see Boletín del Ministerio de Hacienda (México, 1886), pp. 275-278.
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soon begin receiving cash in terest paym ents. The government 
was to establish a financial agency in Mexico to supervise the 
conversion of the debt, and designated the prestigious London 
firm of Glyn, Mills, Currie and Co. as banker in charge of 
m aking in terest paym ents beginning Jan u ary  1887.29
Table 1: Conversion of the Mexican Foreign Debt, 1885-86 
(in Thousands of Pound Sterling)
Classification of Debt3 Totalb Recognized0 Saving
Bonds of 1851 10,241 10,241 _
Coupons 1851 bonds 6,144 922 5,223
Bonds of 1864 4,864 2,432 2,432
Bonds of 1837 434 87 347
Certificates of 1851 180 36 144
Baring Certificates 75 15 60
Bonds of 1843 200 58 142
English Conv. Debt 1,180 824 357
Bonds of 1846 21 11 11
Totals 23,343 14,626 8,717
a The exact definition of each kind of debt may be found in the  Memorias de 
Hacienda, bu t it should be noted th a t the first three categories listed 
(1851 bonds, unpaid coupons of 1851 bonds, and the  bonds of 1864) all 
derived from the original foreign loans of 1824 and 1825 and subsequent 
unpaid interest.
b Debt outstanding according to num ber of bonds in circulation before 
Ju n e  22, 1885.
c Am ount of debt recognized by the government on basis of decree of 
Ju n e  22, 1885, and agreem ents signed with the Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders on June  23, 1886.
Sources: Memoria de Hacienda, México (1886-88) and A nnual Report (1886-
88 ).
The debt conversion of 1886 represented a major step forward 
in the solution and reduction of the complex financial quandary
29 Glyn, Mills were the m ain correspondents of Banco Nacional de México in London 
and the  la tte r had a large account w ith the London firm.
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th a t had brought so much anguish to Mexico over a period of 
six decades. The complex negotiations led to a sophisticated fi­
nancial solution th a t provided substantial relief by reducing the 
recognized capital of the outstanding debt. The exact natu re  of 
the benefits has long been a subject of debate, but grosso modo it 
can be argued th a t the Mexican government obtained a saving 
of some eight million pesos in the shape of debt capital reduc­
tions on the foreign debt (see Table 1) and additional savings 
on the in ternal debt.
The outstanding foreign debt was composed of a variety of 
bond issues, the most im portant being derived from the old 
Mexican loans issued in London in 1824 and 1825 and the in­
te rest backlog on them. The previous conversion of 1851 had 
established th a t Mexico owed 10.2 million pound sterling to the 
British bondholders, bu t since th a t time an additional debt had 
accum ulated in the shape of in terest unpaid between 1851 and 
1861 (before the European invasion of Mexico) and the in terest 
unpaid from 1867 to 1886. The decree of Dublán of June 22, 
1885, had established th a t the conversion agreem ent of 1851 
would be recognized in full (that is £ 10.2 million) but th a t the 
greater part of the in terest backlog from 1851 would be struck 
from the books. Thus a savings of £ 7.7 million was established 
by the Finance M inistry and accepted by the British bond­
holders. The rem aining foreign debts included a potpourri of 
bonds, the value of which also was reduced substantially .30 In 
all cases the foreign bondholders were to receive new th ree per­
cent bonds payable in gold.
It should be noted, however, th a t the Mexican government 
did not only conduct negotiations w ith the foreign bondholders. 
There was also a long list of local creditors who requested pay­
30 On the labyrinthine negotiations related to these additional external bonds there  is 
abundant contem porary literature, including the  already cited works of Casasús, 
Bulnes, Ortiz de Montellano and Bazant. Additional information can be found in the 
annual reports of the Secretaría de Hacienda and in those of the  Corporation of For­
eign Bondholders. It should also be noted th a t there was a large block of outstand­
ing "Mexican Im perial Bonds" held in France, which had been issued by the  regime of 
Maximilian (1863-67) but which were subsequently repudiated by Mexico since they 
served m ainly to finance the  invasion and occupation of Mexico by French troops.
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m ent on their claims, some dating from as far back as 1850, but 
most stem m ing from financial advances made to the arm ies of 
Benito Juárez  and to the adm inistrations in power from 1867 
to the 1880s. In toto, these claims were estim ated a t 57 million 
pesos and were converted to approximately 25 million pesos in 
three percent bonds, although it was stipulated th a t they were 
only payable in silver. This in ternal debt consolidation -  in com­
bination w ith the foreign debt conversion -  m arked a substan­
tial advance in the stabilization of Mexican finances and proj­
ected a new image which modified the views of foreign bankers 
and investors w ith respect to the creditworthiness of the nation.
In order to guarantee the external debt conversion, Dublán 
made arrangem ents w ith BANAMEX for the transfer of the 
biannual debt paym ents from Mexico to London, and through­
out 1887 the Mexican bank advanced the sums required and 
placed them  w ith Glyn, Mills.31 It was from this tim e th a t BA­
NAMEX became the formal agent for the government for all its 
foreign debt operations and paym ents, a role it would continue 
to exercise until 1913. But this was not the only contribution of 
the bank to the restructuring  of Mexican finance, for once 
again the ubiquitous Noetzlin, head of the BANAMEX board in 
Paris, was charged by the Mexican government w ith the 
negotiation of a foreign loan. In contrast to his previous b itter 
experience of 1884, Noetzlin was now able to pull off a major 
financial coup by arranging the issue of the great 1888 con­
version loan in London and Berlin.
31 See contracts 12-17, between November 27, 1886, and Jan u ary  2, 1888, which relate 
to these debt service payments. AHBAN, Libro de Contratos Originales de Em prés­
titos, 1883-1914.
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5. T h e 1888 F o r e ig n  Loan: G a in in g  A c c e ss  to  E u ro p ea n
M on ey  M ark ets
There were several striking aspects to the new foreign loan, 
the first being its positive im pact on the overall credit situation 
of the Mexican government. The nominal value of this loan was
10.5 million pound sterling, w ith a net re tu rn  for Mexico of ap­
proximately £ 8.2 million. W ith the la tte r sum, Dublán was able 
to convert the bulk of the outstanding foreign bonds, acquired 
a t 40 percent of the ir face value, and to pay off most of the 
short-term  debts due to BANAMEX from 1885 onwards.32 In 
his annual financial report, Dublán argued th a t together with 
the previous conversions of 1885-86, this transaction reduced 
the outstanding Mexican foreign debt from £ 22 million to £
10.5 million. In addition, it allowed the liquidation of 12 
million pesos in floating debts. In other words, the term s and 
funding received apparently  made this the most favourable 
debt renegotiation in the history of the nation.33
Nonetheless, contemporaries in Mexico and abroad argued 
th a t the loan arrangem ent was not as satisfactory as Dublán 
m aintained. On the one hand, the obscure financial juggling in­
volved in the acquisition of outstanding bonds which were to be 
exchanged for the new gold bonds, offered to both bankers and 
politicians extremely attractive opportunities for profitable 
speculation. In fact, these transactions strongly recall modern- 
day "swap" operations w ith Latin American debt, in which the 
profit m argins tend to be quite high.
On the other hand, the 1888 loan tended to place Mexican fi­
nances increasingly under the sway of European bankers, the 
most im portant being the G erm an syndicate headed by the fa­
mous firm of Bleichröder, banker to Bismark. How Noetzlin
32 It should be noted th a t in the agreem ent signed w ith the  bondholders in  September 
1886 Dublán had m anaged to extract the concession of being allowed to acquire all 
outstanding bonds a t a future date a t 40 percent of their nom inal value. In practice, 
the three  percent bonds sold a t approximately th is price on the London m arket.
33 Memoria de Hacienda, México (1889: XXXIII).
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was able to convince Bleichröder to participate is not known, 
but it m ay be suspected th a t the Berlin banker was well 
informed of the state  of Mexican finances since he had long 
been a major stockholder in BANAMEX.34 Moreover, the move 
into Mexico coincided w ith the objectives of Germ an foreign 
policy which favored expansion into new regions in which Ger­
m an trade could make inroads. According to Stern:
In 1888' Bleichröder opened up yet another country to Germ an in ­
fluence: it was he who organized a major in ternational loan to 
Mexico a t a tim e when th a t country's government was desperate­
ly looking for European help. Mexico's need was great and Euro­
pean in terest minimal: the G erm an m inister in Mexico thought 
th a t the only guarantee for the healthy development of Mexican 
politics was the person of President Porfirio Díaz; all other signs 
were unfavorable. Given everybody's skepticism, Bleichröder 
could extract singularly advantageous term s for his consortium... 
(Stern 1977: 427).
Indeed, the financial term s were singularly attractive to the 
European bankers since they were to take the first tranche of 
£3 .7  million of the loan a t a low 70 percent of the loan and a 
second tranche of £ 5.8 million a t 85 percent. Given th a t Bleich­
röder was able to sell the bonds corresponding to these two 
issues a t 85 percent and 92 percent, respectively, it may be es­
tim ated th a t his consortium garnered earnings of over £ 700,000 
simply by selling the Mexican securities on the European m ar­
kets. The money, however, did not go only to the G erm an ban­
kers but also to other financial houses participating: 62 percent 
w ent to the Bleichröder syndicate, 20 percent to Antony Gibbs 
and Sons of London, and 18 percent to the BANAMEX branch 
in Paris.35
34 It should also be noted th a t a large circle of Germ an m erchants in Mexico had major 
in terests in BANAMEX. For details on stockholders of the  bank see Ludlow (1990).
35 Bleichröder also received an additional commission of £ 130,000 for tak ing  charge of 
the  whole transaction. Details are in Memoria de Hacienda, México (1889; 1890).
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Figure 5: Negotiation of  1888 Gold Loan of Mexico3
P r e l im in a r y  m ee t in g  of  
b a n k e r s  and  Noetzl in  
in L o n d o n
B anco  N aciona l  de México 
(o ffices  in M exico  City 
an d  L o n d o n )
F in a n c e  M in is t ry  
M e x ic a n  G o v e r n m e n t
Counci l  o f  M in is ter s  
M ex ic a n  G o v e r n m e n t
Sa le  o f  £ 5 ,780 ,000  
r e m a in in g  bo n d s  a t  85 %
C o n t r a c t  s igned  in B er l in  
by S. B le ich rö d er  o f  Ber lin ,  
A. G ibbs  o f  L o n d o n  a nd  
Noetzl in  of Banco  N ac iona l  
de  Mexico
Issue  o f  bo n d s  by b a n k e r s  
w ho  ta k e  £ 3 ,700 ,000  firm 
a t 70  %  nom ina l  va lue
B ank ing  Synd ica te  led by 
B a r o n  B le i c h r ö d e r
a "Bonds o f  the  Foreign  C o n so l id a te d  D eb t  of Mexico",  law of  D e ce m b e r  13, 1887; 
r a t i f ied ,  M arch  24, 1888. Nom inal  value: 10,500,000 pounds  ster ling.
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Figure 6: Debt Service Mechanisms of External Debt of Mexico.
1888 Gold Loan of £10,500,000. Payments of Interest 
and Amortization
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Ex e c u t iv e
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G o v e r n m e n t
M ex ic an  F i n a n c i a l  
A genc y in L o n d o n
a S. B le ich iöde r ,  bank ing  firm of  Berlin ,  was in charge of placing the  loan in 
E u ro p e  as well as o f  the  d eb t  serv ice ,  charging  lA %  commission  on  each  t r a n s ­
a c t io n  o f  the  la t te r .
b Paym ents  to  the  b o n d h o ld e rs  w e re  u sed  to  cover  the  3%  b ian n u a l  in te re s t  due 
(6%  ann u a l ) ,  as well as the  1%  an n u a l  a m o r t iz a t io n  quo tas .
S ource :  M em o r ia  de H a c ie n d a ,  M éxico  (1888-1890).
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O ther individuals reaping the benefits of the Mexican loan 
included Edouard Noetzlin, who received a paym ent of one mil­
lion pesos for his services as interm ediary w ith the European 
bankers, Benito Gómez Farias, head of the Mexican public debt 
office, and Joaquín Casasús, financial advisor to the govern­
ment, who both received large commissions. It was also argued 
th a t an indirect but major beneficiary was the former pres­
ident, M anuel González, who had bought up large am ounts of 
old bonds before the conversion and the loan.36 Evidently, the 
great conversion loan not only contributed to stabilizing Mexi­
can finances but also proved to be a gold mine for numerous 
financiers and politicians on both sides of the Atlantic.
The London Times severely criticized the entire loan tran s­
action. It pointed out th a t the Mexican government had been 
facing severe difficulties as a resu lt of the large floating debt 
and th a t previous solutions had not been successful. It further 
commented th a t Noetzlin appeared to m aintain  an extremely 
w arm  relationship w ith Bleichröder despite the fact th a t the 
French banker was him self the official agent of the Mexican 
government for the renegotiation of the public debt. Especially 
severe critisism  was directed by the London new spaper a t the 
advantages Bleichröder reaped by being able to exchange de­
valued bonds of 1851 and 1862, albeit a t a discount, for new 
gold bonds, for the possible speculative gains here were enor­
mous. I t added:
Such an arrangem ent is manifestly very advantageous to the con­
tractor, and much in opposition to the in terest of Mexico....To raise 
money to pay off a floating debt upon which a Government pays 
even as much as 12 percent upon such term s as these is not good 
finance....The only explanation is th a t the Mexican government 
are greatly harassed by the persistent dem ands of the National 
Bank of Mexico to repay loans made to the Government which are 
of long standing (Economist Intelligence U nit Ms. 1954: 180-181).
Despite the criticism, the bond sales were successful and the 
high quotations of Mexican bonds after 1888 on both the Berlin
36 On commissions to Noetzlin and González's speculation see B azant (1968: 124-125).
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and the London stock exchanges m arked a radical change in 
the prospects for raising new loans. The new issues came fast 
and furiously. In 1889 the Mexican Tehuantepec railroad, a gov­
ernm ent-run operation, issued £ 2.7 million of mortgage bonds 
in Europe through the offices of the D resdner Bank and the 
D arm städter Bank. Simultaneously, the Mexico City govern­
m ent raised a two million pound loan in London for major 
drainage works. Soon after Bleichröder returned  to the fray, 
leading a consortium in 1890 for the issue of six million pounds 
of bonds for the Mexican federal government to help w ith 
railroad finance, as well as a loan in 1893 of £ three million for 
refinancing purposes.
At the same time foreign direct investm ents in Mexico in ­
creased markedly. The largest investm ents were in railroads, 
predom inantly controlled by United S tates and B ritish con­
cerns. Interestingly enough, during the 1890s a large percent­
age of stocks and bonds of the U. S. railroads in Mexico were 
sold to B ritish investors, a trend indicating the high rating  of 
Mexican securities in Europe. At the same tim e the shares of 
num erous mining, tram way, electrical, banking, industrial and 
land companies established in Mexico began to be sold on the 
in ternational money m arkets, principally in New York, Lon­
don, Paris, Berlin and Am sterdam .37
6. T h e M ex ica n  M arket for  P u b lic  S e c u r it ie s
While the Porfirian government was clearly successful in gain­
ing access to European money m arkets after 1888, it is less 
clear to w hat extent it was able to stim ulate local dem and for 
public securities. In fact, a t first glance it would appear th a t 
Finance M inister Dublán and his successors M atías Romero 
(1891-93) and José Yves Lim antour (1893-1910) relied essen-
37 For m uch information on foreign investm ents in Mexico in the period see Nicolau 
D'Olwer (1965: 973-1185).
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tially on foreign funds to cover the credit needs of the Mexican 
government. Nonetheless, this is not an entirely adequate des­
cription of the situation since a series of policies were adopted 
which aimed precisely a t the possibility of raising an increas­
ing volume of funds internally .38
Our review of the years 1886-90 indicates th a t the Finance 
M inistry devoted most of its attention to the conversion of in­
ternal debts ra th e r th an  to the sale of securities which pre­
sumably could have provided a fresh flow of long-term funding. 
The conversion consisted basically of a process of exchanging 
old bonds and certificates a t reduced rates for new three per­
cent in ternal bonds, payable in silver. This did not, therefore, 
imply much buying or selling of public securities. Creditors 
simply presented the ir claims and titles, including all kinds of 
government paper from different periods of the n ineteenth  cen­
tury, to the public debt office and, in case of favorable judge­
ment, received the new bonds. These procedures were also simi­
lar in the case of the railroad companies, which received be­
tween 1885 and 1890 certificates and five percent railraod con­
struction bonds; they used these to pay im port taxes on the e- 
quipm ent they im ported or, alternatively, they sold the certifi­
cates a t a discount to BANAMEX which placed them  with im­
porters.
Although it seems apparent th a t there had not developed a 
true m arket for long-term public securities, it is also evident 
th a t by 1890 a large volume of new internal bonds were in cir­
culation and th a t in terest paym ents were now being made on a 
fairly regular basis. Some buying and selling w ent on, although 
inform ation on the volume transacted in the Mexico City mon­
ey m arket is difficult to find in the financial press of the period. 
There are num erous references which indicate th a t the dis­
38 Traditional historiography of the  period does not explore the  n a tu re  of internal 
m arkets in Mexico for public securities. W hat follows is therefore based on a pre­
lim inary survey of publications of the  M inistry of Finance, bu t m uch additional re­
search is required w ith m aterials from bank archives and the  contemporary Mexi­
can financial press.
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counts on such in ternal bonds were considerable: discounts of 
over 60 percent on the three percent bonds and 20-25 percent 
discounts on the railroad certificates.39 To summarize, the gov­
ernm ent could not yet stim ulate the development of a dynamic 
local m arket as it was still embroiled in the solution of old debt 
policies which had left behind literally thousands of individual 
claims.40
The government, nonetheless, continued to require local 
sources of credit. The solution found was straightforw ard and 
consisted of relying systematically on BANAMEX, which ad­
vanced funds on current account to the Finance M inistry and 
also provided short-term  loans which were rolled over, becoming 
m edium -term  credits of two or three years. In order to be able 
to count upon the support of Banco Nacional de México such 
credits eventually had to be liquidated. As a result, a consider­
able percentage of the foreign loans of the period were ear­
m arked for this purpose: over ten million pesos of the great for­
eign loan of 1888 went directly to BANAMEX to pay off debts 
and close to 30 percent of the 1890 loan of six million pound 
sterling were used for the same purpose.41
The dependence on in ternal short-term  credits was accen­
tuated  during the years 1891-93 when the Mexican government 
was confronted w ith another crisis situation, which in many 
ways was more severe than  th a t of 1885. In the early 1890s the 
causes of the economic dow nturn were basically three: (1) the 
agrarian  crisis which was provoked by bad harvests during two 
successive years; (2) the dram atic fall in the in ternational price 
of silver, still the principal export; (3) the weakening of in te r­
national financial m arkets, first as a resu lt of the 1890 Baring
39 I am a t p resent conducting a study on quotations and discounts on the  basis of the 
financial press, bu t the results are still inconclusive.
40 These included not only credits due to enterprises and m erchants or moneylenders, 
bu t also a large backlog of unpaid salaries to government employees and pensioners.
41 The bulk of th is loan went to liquidate the old unpaid subsidies due to the  Central 
and N ational Railways, which received 17 million pesos in exchange for 23 million 
pesos in claims. An additional 9,283,000 pesos went to Banco Nacional de México to 
pay off the loans it had advanced (Memoria de Hacienda, México 1890: XXX-XXXI).
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Crisis in London and, la ter in 1893, as a resu lt of the crash in 
New York. The agrarian  crisis required some extraordinary 
expenditures, bu t it was the declining price of silver th a t h it 
the government hardest, since it led to a steep fall in  the for­
eign trade of the nation: im port tax revenues, still more than  
40 percent of total ordinary revenues, dropped precipitously.
Finance M inister Romero found it impossible a t this time to 
sell new in ternal securities; nobody w anted to buy bonds pay­
able in silver at a time of falling silver prices. His only solution 
was to request renewed assistance from BANAMEX, which was 
clearly the pillar of the state 's financial edifice, although it 
continued to be entirely privately-owned. On A ugust 1, 1892, 
BANAMEX advanced £ 600,000 in conjunction w ith a syndi­
cate of bankers in Berlin, London and Paris; ten percent of cus­
tomhouse revenues were mortgaged to the loan. Then, in March 
of 1893, a new advance of 2,500,000 pesos was made, in ex­
change for which BANAMEX took over the adm inistration of the 
m int (Casa de Moneda) in both Mexico City and San Luis Po­
tosí. Finally, in June 1893, a final short-term  loan of £ 267,500 
was made to pay pending railroad subsidies. In th is case BA­
NAMEX obtained a mortgage on four percent of all import 
taxes and the entire proceeds of the stam p taxes on alcoholic 
beverages sold throughout the Republic.42
By this tim e it appeared th a t BANAMEX was once again on 
the verge of becoming an old-style moneylender w ith a s tran ­
glehold grip on the national Treasury and its fiscal offices. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted th a t the in terest ra tes charged 
were no longer tru ly  usurious, but ra th e r determ ined by the 
m arket situation, locally and internationally. Furtherm ore, the 
directors of the bank were aware th a t if the government were 
pressured into a desperate situation, then recourse would once 
again be taken to the suspension of paym ents, as had  been the 
case in June 1885.
42 For data  on the loans see contracts 26, 28, 29 in AHBAN, Libro de Contratos Origi­
nales de Em préstitos, 1883-1914.
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For BANAMEX it was clear th a t more money could be made 
by continuing to serve as loyal government banker. This be­
came once again m anifest as a result of the issue of the foreign 
loan of three million pounds in late 1893. Despite extremely 
low quotations for Mexican bonds on the European m arkets, 
the new Finance M inister Lim antour was obliged to go through 
with the transaction in order to obtain the necessary proceeds 
to pay off BANAMEX, Bleichröder and other financial houses 
which had advanced sums in the years im mediately preceding.43
The lessons of the extremely expensive foreign loan of 1893 
were not lost on Limantour, who proceeded in September 1894 
to restructu re the Mexican debt and to in itia te a new policy 
aimed a t finally creating a m arket for long-term internal bonds, 
payable in silver. His principal objective was to reduce the 
Treasury's dependence on advances by BANAMEX and a t the 
same tim e force railroad and public works' contractors to 
accept paym ents in long-term internal bonds ra th e r than  cus­
tomhouse certificates or other short-term  liabilities. According 
to the decree ratified on September 6, 1894, the government 
created a new type of five percent silver bond to be issued in 
various tranches of tw enty million pesos.44
The bulk of these new bonds went to the railroad companies 
and contractors in successive issues (Sept. 6, 1894; Dec. 10, 
1895; Jan . 3, 1898; Dec. 23, 1899, and June 9, 1902), reaching 
a grand total of 100 million pesos a t the tu rn  of the century. 
Initially the companies took the bonds a t a discount and held 
them  or attem pted to find ways of placing them, largely w ith the 
assistance of BANAMEX, although as long as silver prices re­
m ained depressed the m arket was weak for these securities. 
By 1898, however, as silver prices recovered, Mexican private 
bankers, such as the house of Hugo Scherer, found m eans of
43 Mexican bonds had been declining since mid 1891 bu t by 1893 the 1888 bonds had 
fallen on the Berlin stock m arket to 65. The bankers (Bleichröder and the European 
office of BANAMEX) took £ 1,650,000 of the  loan firm a t 60 and £ 950,000 a t 65. The 
sale of the  bonds was postponed to early 1894 because the m arkets rem ained weak. 
For details see Wynne (1951,11: 52-53).
44 For details on the  1894 loan restructuring see Castillo (1903: 274-304).
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placing large blocks on prim ary and secondary financial m ar­
kets throughout Europe.45 Investors who bought the bonds at 
75 percent of nominal value a t a time of rising silver prices 
could expect to reap significant profits, although clearly the 
risks were considerable.
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45 On the role of Scherer and Co. in placing Mexican securities in Europe there  is some 
data  in  Poidevin (1969: 13-14, 212, 333-35, 716-17).
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The price of silver on international m arkets h it rock-bottom 
in Jan u ary  1895, after which it made a notable recovery th a t 
lasted until mid-1896. Subsequently, lasting for five years, sil­
ver prices tended to stabilize, suffering small fluctuations. 
Throughout this period, therefore, bonds payable in silver had 
the attraction of retain ing  their value of offering good opportu­
nities for profits on account of the discount prices a t which they 
were offered by the government.
In conclusion, the new policies of promoting the issue of in ­
te rna l bonds after 1894 were a notable success which contribu­
ted to a m arked decline in the government deficits from th a t 
time onwards. Nonetheless, it would still rem ain questionable 
w hether Lim antour had actually been successful in stim ulating 
the creation of a local m arket for public securities. After all, 
the majority of these bonds found their way to Europe, where 
they rem ained. An additional indicator of the failure of the gov­
ernm ent to generate much local in terest in such securities was 
th a t between 1902 and 1910 very small sums of new in ternal 
bonds were issued, most new long-term financing being accom­
plished through the m eans of foreign loans.
7. C o n c lu s io n s
To sum up, our brief review of Mexican financial developments 
in the era of the "Porfiriato" offers two firm conclusions and a 
num ber of prelim inary hypotheses which require fu rther re ­
search. In the first place, it does seem clear th a t the financial 
reforms of the 1880s did perm it a fundam ental restructu ring  of 
the Mexican internal and external public debt, facilitating re ­
newed access to in ternational capital m arkets. However, the 
financial costs of these operations were extremely high and 
tied governm ent finances into the strategies of the European 
bankers, in particu lar Bleichröder, who was in a position to 
dictate for several years term s on most loan issues.
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In the second place, while the debt reforms did allow the con­
tracting  of a new long-term debt in order to replace short-term  
debts, the government did not escape from its extrem e depen­
dency on one key banking institution, the BANAMEX, which 
became the government banker locally and internationally. The 
symbiotic relationship between the Finance M inistry and BA­
NAMEX becomes apparent upon the analysis of each major fi­
nancial reform and contract.
Several less conclusive points are illustrated  by our analysis 
of the m arkets for public and private securities. It would ap­
pear th a t despite efforts by the Mexican Finance M inistry to 
create a m arket for long-term public securities, there was little 
success in stim ulating much in terest among the Mexican inves­
ting public, w ith the resu lt th a t most of the in ternal bonds 
were finally sold in Europe. The apparent w eakness of the local 
money m arket for public securities apparently  obliged the gov­
ernm ent to cover its current credit operations by relying es­
sentially on its local banker, BANAMEX, which continued to 
exercise th is role until 1913 or 1914. Nonetheless, there are 
many open questions w ith respect to the way th a t Mexican 
banks, such as BANAMEX, organized the buying and selling of 
government paper. In this sense, it would appear th a t the pre­
cise na tu re  of "money and capital m arkets" in Mexico in this 
period require fu rther investigation and discussion to clarify 
exactly w hat we understand by these concepts and which role 
they played in the adm inistration of public finance in the dec­
ades im m ediately preceding the revolution of 1910.
